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Summary 
 
This is a comparative study of the average and median approval times for 
pharmaceutical innovations (new molecular entities -NMES- and new biologics), 
authorised in the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU) under the 
centralised procedure, during the period 1995 to 2003. Marketing withdrawals for safety 
reasons have been monitored, since in both cases the objective is to obtain faster 
reviews without compromising safety. A total of 346 innovations were authorised 
during this period in the US (274 NMEs and 72 new biologics) and 169 in the EU. On 
average for the period under study, the mean approval time for these innovations was 
14.7 months in the EU versus 18.2 months in the US (16.2 months if new biologics are 
excluded). Similar results were obtained from the comparison of median approval times. 
Nevertheless, in both cases, the approval time for priority NMEs authorised by the FDA 
was markedly shorter. Despite the differences between both approval procedures, the 
percentages of withdrawals were very similar: 2.2 % in the US and between 1.6 % and 
2.7 % in the EU, depending on the approach used for calculations. Finally, a 
comparison was also made of approval times of the 117 innovations that were 
authorised simultaneously in both the US and in the EU during the period under study. 
The results obtained in this regard differ from the previously stated ones. Although the 
mean approval time for standard innovations continues to be shorter in the EU, the 
mean approval time for pharmaceutical innovations as a whole is now shorter in the US 
(12.5 months versus 14.3 months in the EU). The explanation can be found in the 
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predominance of priority NMEs included in the set of innovations approved for both 
markets. This outcome reveals one of the main differences between both authorisation 
procedures: unlike the US, the EU has not established a fast-track review system for 
therapeutically relevant drugs.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this study is to compare approval and review times for 
pharmaceutical innovations authorised by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and by the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA), under 
the centralised procedure. This paper contemplates NMEs1 and new biologics for 
human use authorised during the period 1995-2003. A comparison of safety-based NME 
withdrawals by both Agencies has also been carried out. Given that the products 
authorised by both Agencies are not necessarily the same, the study has identified the 
pharmaceutical innovations authorised simultaneously in the EU and in the US during 
the time period previously mentioned. This approach enabled a comparison to be made 
of the total approval times it took both Agencies to authorise the exact same products. 
 
Drug approval procedures in the EU and the US underwent significant changes 
during the 60s and again during the 90s, until they were established as they currently 
stand. Among the reasons for these modifications, technical progress in the 
pharmaceutical sector, human tragedies resulting from drug safety issues, and delays in 
gaining approval for therapeutic innovations can be cited. Approval delays for new 
drugs that represent significant therapeutic advances have significant implications for 
                                                 
1 New molecular entities, that is, drugs whose active substances have not been previously approved for 
therapeutic use. 
 3
both human health and returns on the R&D investments made by the industry to obtain 
them. One of the enormous challenges the regulatory Agencies are confronted with 
when approving drugs has to do with smoothing the way for patient access to drugs 
which represent therapeutic advances without jeopardising safety. Therein lies the 
interest of the study presented in this paper. Section 2 presents a brief analysis of the 
historical evolution of marketing authorisation procedures in the EU and in the US from 
the 1960s to the present time. Section 3 explains the sources of information used and the 
method applied for the comparative study. Section 4 covers the outcomes and finally, 
Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
 
 
 2. Historical Evolution of Marketing Authorisation Procedures in the 
European Union and in the United States 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is subject to extensive regulation because of the 
complex nature of drugs. Authorisation procedures in particular must respond to the 
need to protect public health. The technical evolution the sector underwent at the 
beginning of the twentieth century led to the obtention of potent remedies by means of 
chemical synthesis. Subsequently, pharmacists began to question their responsibility 
with respect to the new mass-produced drugs obtained by the industry [1]. 
Unfortunately, time and human tragedies have been needed for approval procedures for 
mass-produced drugs to be founded on scientifically defined quality, safety, and 
efficacy criteria, as is currently the case in most developed countries. 
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As a consequence of the malformations caused by Thalidomide, the EU 
established that as of 1965 all medicinal products would require authorisation prior to 
marketing. Market authorisation would be granted on the basis of quality, safety, and 
efficacy criteria. Thalidomide was not marketed in the US, but the company provided it 
to more than 1,200 physicians for clinical testing [2]. Despite the fact that the 
Thalidomide tragedy was safety-related and not efficacy-related, the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments to the Food and Drug Act in 1962 added an efficacy requirement to the 
existing safety parameters [3]. Thus, from the mid 1960s onwards, quality, efficacy, and 
safety have determined the obtention of drug marketing authorisation in the US as well 
as in the EU.   
 
 Shortly thereafter, criticisms arose in the US about the delays in marketing 
therapeutically relevant drugs and the phrase “drug lag” was coined. Later on, AIDS 
contributed to intensifying the drug lag controversy [3]. In Europe during the 1980s, the 
pharmaceutical industry pressed for faster drug approvals in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Sweden. “The first stage in imputing slowness and inefficiency to 
regulatory authorities was to claim that new drugs were not being approved fast 
enough”. In particular, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry claimed 
that “… delaying approvals was detrimental to the British economy because it resulted 
in drug development work going abroad” [4]. From the industry’s perspective, shorter 
approval times for new drugs save time and expense, increase the effective life of drug 
patents, hence, enhancing the expected returns on R&D activities. The challenge faced 
by the regulatory agencies charged with approving drugs is to expedite patient access to 
drugs that represent therapeutic advances without compromising safety. In this context, 
 5
it is worth highlighting that therapeutic harms are (politically) more conspicuous than 
potential forgone therapeutic benefits [2]. 
 
 In the US, “… in response to criticism that the FDA was taking too long to 
approve the NDAs [New Drug Applications] of drugs with potentially large therapeutic 
impacts, the FDA implemented a drug-classification system” in 1974 [2]. The “ABC 
system” sought to focus greater attention and invest more effort into A-1 drugs; that is, 
NMEs (classified as 1) that appear to offer significant therapeutic advance (classified as 
A) [5]. J. Richard Crout, who at that time was the Director of the FDA’s Bureau of 
Drugs, preferred to call it a priority review system, as opposed to a fast track system, 
“… because somebody’s going to look at the data and say, ‘well, you … can’t make the 
A and B drugs go faster’, which [was]… true” [5]. 
 
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) negotiated by Congress, the 
FDA, and the pharmaceutical industry, was passed in 1992. Under the provisions of the 
PDUFA, “… drug companies pay fees that allow the FDA to add more resources and 
speed up drug review time” [6]. Review-time goals were established that distinguished 
between priority drugs and standard drugs.2 The PDUFA was passed two more times, 
once in 1997 and again, in 2002. Briefly put, the review-time goals established at the 
end of PDUFA I, II, and III were: review of 90% of priority original new drug and 
biologic applications within 6 months, review of 90% of standard applications within 12 
months under PDUFA I, and within 10 months under PDUFA II and III [7].   
 
                                                 
2 Priority drugs are products that appear to represent a significant therapeutic or public health advance 
over available therapy. Standard drugs are those not designated as priority drugs and that appear to have 
similar therapeutic qualities as those of an already marketed drug.  
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 In the EU, the intense regulation of the pharmaceutical sector responds basically 
to two objectives: to protect public health and to complete the single market for 
pharmaceuticals [8]. Consequently,  starting in 1978, efforts were made so that, having 
received authorisation in one member State, other Member States could recognise the 
original evaluation process. This was known as the “multi-State procedure”, subject to 
specific deadlines. The purpose was to facilitate the authorisation of a drug in several 
Member States simultaneously. The results obtained with this procedure were not very 
positive, particularly because the decision lied ultimately with the national health care 
authorities and, often, dissimilar decisions were adopted with respect to the same 
product. Paralelly, in 1987, a concertation procedure was established for the 
authorisation of medicinal products resulting from biotechnical processes. The 
advantage of this procedure was that it minimised discrepancies between health care 
authorities of the different Member States.  
 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93,3  in force since 1995, established new 
marketing authorisation procedures in the EU4. On the one hand, it created a new 
mutual recognition procedure, aimed at extending an authorisation granted in one 
Member State to the remaining Member States. The decision adopted according to this 
procedure must be a single, binding decision throughout the entire EU. Secondly, the 
afore-cited regulation created a centralised procedure. The centralised procedure is 
mandatory for high-technology products (i.e., developed by recombinant DNA 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EEC) of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation 
and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, Official Journal of the European Union, L214, 24.8.1993.  
 
4 The reform of these procedures will come into force as of 20 November 2005, by virtue of Regulation 
(EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, laying down 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, Offcial Journal of the European Union, 
L136, 30.4. 2004.  
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technology), and optional for other innovations (namely NMEs and medicinal products 
presented for new indications or administered by means of new drug delivery systems 
which are of significant therapeutic interest) included in List A and List B product 
categories, respectively. Authorisation of a drug under the centralised procedure means 
that the authorisation is valid in all EU Member States. The review-time goal 
established in the centralised procedure is 300 days under normal circumstances (210 
days for scientific assessment and opinion and approximately 90 days for the decision-
making process). 
 
The EMEA was created in 19955; “… partly in response to demands from 
consumers’ organisations… and the European Parliament. It was founded to enable 
Community institutions to discharge their considerable responsibilities resulting from 
the introduction of … new marketing authorisation procedures”, mainly the centralised 
procedure [8].  
 
The FDA and the EMEA authorisation procedures differ in two important 
aspects. First, marketing authorisations granted under the centralised European 
procedure are subject to renewal after five years. Second, unlike the US, a fast-track 
initiative has not been established in the EU, though some products can receive 
conditional authorisation under “exceptional circumstances”. All in all, the EU does not 
distinguish between priority-review and standard-review drugs. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The EMEA has its headquarters in London and has been recently renamed the European Medicines 
Agency.  
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3. Materials and Method 
 
The information used regarding the pharmaceutical innovations authorised in the 
EU under the centralised procedure was obtained from the List of Authorised Products 
(EPARs; European Public Assessment Reports), available at the EMEA Website 
http://www.emea.eu.int/). Given that not only NMEs are approved by means of the 
centralised procedure, a data cleaning process has been carried out, so as to eliminate 
duplicates and to make the comparison with innovations authorised by the FDA 
feasible. Furthermore, the EMEA does not distinguish between NMEs and new 
biologics. Although the dividing line between both is not entirely clear, most new 
biologics are included in List A. The estimates of approval and review times were made 
(except for in the last part of the study) differentiating between the two product 
categories establisehd by the EMEA, that is, List A and List B. The estimated approval 
time starts at the date of application validation to the date the European Commission 
makes its decision. The review time was calculated by subtracting the clock-stop time it 
takes sponsoring companies to respond to queries or to address deficiencies identified 
from the approval time. The times corresponding to withdrawn innovations have not 
been taken into account in the time estimates because once the European Commission 
adopts the decision to withdraw a marketing authorisation, the corresponding report is 
pulled from the EMEA website.  
 
Much of the information about NMEs authorised by the FDA was taken from the 
information the FDA makes available at http://www.fda.gov/, distinguishing between 
priority and standard NMEs. The CDER (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research) 
annual reports entitled, CDER Report to the Nation (http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/) 
have been particularly useful. Likewise, information compiled by the PhRMA 
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(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, available at 
http://www.phrma.org/) has also been used. Information compiled by the PhRMA has 
been needed to complement the FDA data for two reasons. First of all, in order to 
estimate mean times, since the FDA provides information dealing predominantly with 
median times; that is, the value that falls in the middle of the group after the numbers 
are ranked. According to the CDER in its reports, the median “...provides a truer picture 
of performance than average time, which can be unduly influenced by a few extremely 
long or short times”.6 Secondly, information compiled by the PhRMA on new biologics 
has been used. New biologic products are authorised by a separate division of the FDA, 
the CBER (Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research) and the corresponding 
information currently lacks the accuracy and comprehensiveness of data regarding 
NMEs. Hence, all data on new biologics authorised in the US used in this study have 
been obtained from PhRMA, who in turn, has obtained them from government and 
industry sources. 
 
The estimated approval time, as defined by the FDA, refers to “... the time from 
first NDA submission to NDA approval. It includes the sum of: FDA review time for 
the first submission of an NDA to the Agency, plus any subsequent time during which a 
pharmaceutical sponsor addresses deficiencies in the NDA and resubmits the 
application, plus subsequent FDA review time”. The review time (the time it takes the 
FDA to review a NDA) is the approval time minus the time taken by sponsoring 
companies to address deficiencies identified by the Agency.7  
 
                                                 
6 A guide addressing this issue is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/MedianAPtime/index.htm. 
 
7 See http://www.fda.gov/cder/report/reviewtimes/default.htm. 
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Given that marketing authorisation withdrawals in the EU under the centralised 
procedure imply the removal of the product from the EMEA website, the EMEA 
database only provides reports on favourable decisions. Therefore, to estimate the 
percentage of innovations withdrawn from the total innovations authorised, withdrawals 
were added to the denominator. The analysis of innovation withdrawals in the case of 
the US has been limited to NMEs, since there is no systematic, comprehensive official 
information available regarding biologics.8 
 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 1 represents the comparison of mean NME and new biologic authorisation 
times taken by the EMEA and the FDA during the period 1995-2003. Table 2 records 
the comparison of median authorisation times for the same innovations. The FDA 
review times are only reflected in this last table.9 It must be emphasized that all 
approvals granted in 1995 under the centralised procedure come from applications 
initiated under the former concertation procedure from which they were transferred to 
the new centralised procedure. In these cases, the EMEA data base records the 
application validation date as 1 January 1995, resulting in underestimated times. The 
same applies to 8 of the 19 innovations authorised in 1996. Consequently, for these two 
years, the actual amount of time dedicated to processing the dossiers was also estimated. 
These estimates are represented by the figures in parentheses in Tables 1 and 2 for these 
                                                 
8 The information provided in this regard is accompanied by the following note: “The information in this 
listing reflects CBER’s best efforts to communicate information that has been reported to FDA. Its 
accuracy and comprehensiveness cannot be guaranteed”, http://www.fda.gov/cber/recalls/. See also 
Recalls and Withdrawals at http://www.fda.gov/cber/recallsmore.htm. 
 
9 Provided by the FDA. As regards average times, PhRMA provides the information needed to calculate 
mean approval times,  but not mean review times.  
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two years.  Nevertheless, it is very likely that the figures obtained in this way are higher 
than the figures that would have been obtained in normal circumstances.That is, the 
transition process itself from the old to the new system means that the years 1995 and 
1996 are not representative in principle. Hence, in the last line of Table 1, the average 
figure for the entire period has been calculated omitting the 11 products involved.  
 
During the period 1995-2003, 169 pharmaceutical innovations were authorised 
in the EU under the centalised procedure – 63 included in List A and 106 in List B 
(Table 1). Given that the centralised procedure is optional for innovations included in 
List B, this proportion reflects its success, particularly if we take into account the fact 
that when a product is denied authorisation, it cannot be marketed in any EU country. It 
therefore appears that the pharmaceutical companies have considered that the 
advantages of submitting a single application rather than fifteen outweight the risk of 
having the authorisation denied. In the US, the number of innovations approved totalled 
346: 72 new biologics and 274 NMEs (172 standard NMEs and 102 priority NMEs) 
(Table 1).  
 
As shown in Table 1, the mean approval time of pharmaceutical innovations was 
only lower in the US versus the EU in 1998 and 1999. Approval times decreased 
considerably in the US in these two years, although starting in the 2000, the times 
observed were similar to those seen at the beginning of the period, with the exception of 
priority NMEs approval times. The difference compared to the EU increased 
substantially as of 2002. Overall, for the period 1995-2003, the average approval time 
for pharmaceutical innovations in the EU was 14.7 months versus 18.2 months in the 
US. Please note that this result remains unaltered when the comparison is made omitting 
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the 11 products for which the approval process began under the terms of the former EU 
concertation procedure, given that the figures obtained in this case are practically 
identical.  
 
 The gap between the EU and the US would certainly be narrower if new 
biologics were eliminated from the analysis, since approval times for these products are 
considerably greater in the US than NME approval times (26.0 months and 16.2 
months, respectively).  Grosso modo, this perspective can be approximated by 
comparing NME approval times in the US with approval times for List B products in 
the EU, since List A is largely made up of new biologics. Thus, if we apply this 
approach, the 3.5 month difference would decrease to 1.8 months. Likewise, with the 
exception of the year 1996, it is of interest to note that the mean approval time for 
priority NMEs authorised by the FDA was shorter for each year than it was for products 
included in both List A and List B of the EU.  
 
It was only possible to calculate the mean clock-stop time for approvals granted 
by the EMEA. The overall mean for List A products was approximately one month 
greater than for List B products for the period under study. An even greater difference 
was obtained in a study carried out for the period 1995-1998 and appears to suggest “... 
that the issues addressed by the companies during this time were of a more complex 
nature for List A products” [9].  Given that the review time is practically the same in 
both cases, the  key to understanding the longer approval times for high-tech products 
lies in the clock-stop times.  On average, the mean clock-stop time for approvals during 
the entire study period was 4.8 months versus the review time, which amounted to 9.9 
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months (Table 1). With this result in hand, we can state that the target of 300 days 
established in the centralised procedure has been met.  
 
Table 2 presents the estimated median times. At first glance, the clock-stop time 
tends to be shorter in the US than in the EU, since the difference between approval and 
review time is smaller in the first case. The striking exception to this is the standard 
NMEs in 2003, with a median value of 23.1 months and 13.8 months, respectively 
(Table 2). The median approval time increased significantly in both the US and in the 
EU between the years 1999 and 2000, albeit said increase was greater in the US. The 
following factors may serve as possible explanations for this trend: overworked FDA 
staff, growing pressure triggered by recalls of several major drugs, the greater presence 
of drugs targeting novel mechanisms of action [10], and the increased number of 
applications with multiple or prolonged review cycles.10 Indeed, this last factor appears 
to account for the large gap between median approval and review times in 2000 and in 
2003 for standard NMEs (4.5 and 9.3 months, respectively), reflecting the longer time 
taken by sponsoring companies to address deficiencies.   
 
In turn, the long median approval and review times for priority NMEs for the 
year 2002 are noteworthy. According to the CDER Report to the Nation 2003, this was 
caused “... by the approval of a number of older applications coupled with a decrease in 
the number of new applications received”.11 With the exception of the year 2002, the 
review-time goals put forth in PDUFA I, I, and III have been met for priority NMEs. In 
                                                 
10 See http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/reviewtimes/default.htm. 
 
11 See http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rtn/2003/rtn2003-1.HTM. 
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contrast, the same connot be said of standard NMEs, at least not as regards median 
times,  that is, after omitting the influence of extreme values.  
 
Both the FDA and the EMEA seek faster reviews without compromising safety. 
Given the importance of both objectives, Table 3 shows a follow-up of marketing 
authorisation withdrawals due to safety reasons. To estimate the percentage of 
innovation withdrawals of total authorisations in the EU, apart from the 4 NMEs 
withdrawn shown on Table 3, another 9 innovations have had to be added to the 
denominator. These 9 innovationes were, in principle, voluntarily pulled out by the 
companies, and not due to explicit safety reasons.12 When calculated in this way, a 2.2% 
innovation withdrawal rate was obtained for the period 1995-2003 (4 out of 182). If we 
exclude Tolcapone from the numerator, the result would be 1.6% (3 out of 182); 
however it must be remembered that Tolcapone was reincorporated into the market in 
2004, after the study period. In the US, 2.2% of the NMEs approved were pulled off the 
market (6 out 274 NMEs, given that Alosetron was reintroduced into the market during 
the period under study). Hence, it seems that the percentage of withdrawals is very 
similar for approvals granted in the EU under the centralised procedure and in the US. 
Nevertheless, of the 9 products that were voluntarily pulled by the sponsoring company 
in the EU, one product withdrawal is suspected to be closely related to safety issues. 
The case in point is the Rotavirus Vaccine, which was approved in 1999 and withdrawn 
(at the sponsor’s request) in 2001. It never reached the EU market.13 The company 
pulled this vaccine in the US in 1999 due to a possible association between its use and 
                                                 
12 These are marketing authorisation withdrawals at the sponsoring companies’ request, generally alleging 
marketing reasons, such as the lack of sufficient market. On ocassions, the product withdrawal responds 
to the company not renewing the authorisation 5 years after its first application. 
 
13 See Withdrawal of Marketing Authorisation for the Medicinal Product “… Rotavirus Vaccine” 
EU/1/99/105/001. London, 7 June 2001. Doc. Ref.: EMEA/13002/01. Available at 
http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/human/withdraw/withdraw.htm. 
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the development of intussusception. If this case in point is considered a withdrawal for 
safety reasons, the percentage of withdrawals for safety issues in the EU would total 2.7 
% (5 out of 182).  
 
Given that the previous analysis has taken into account the pharmaceutical 
innovations authorised by the EMEA and by the FDA with no further restrictions, the 
comparative analysis carried out thus far may include different products. Therefore, 
Table 4 presents a comparison of the mean approval times for pharmaceutical 
innovations (NMEs and new biologics) simultaneously authorised in the US and in the 
EU (under the centralised procedure) during the period 1995-2003; that is, the times 
involved for the exact same products. A total of 117 innovations were simultaneously 
approved by both Agencies during the period under study. Of them, 84 were NMEs and 
33, new biologics. It is worth noting that of the 169 innovations approved under the 
centralised procedure, close to 70% was approved by the FDA during the same period. 
This reflects a high degree of coincidence, not only with respect to the products 
themselves, but also in terms of the time dimension. Given this coincidence, the FDA 
drug classification based on therapeutic relevance has been adopted, in order to compare 
priority versus standard drugs in both markets. The seven NMEs that began under the 
provisions of the former EU concertation procedure have been omitted to avoid 
distorting the comparison. 
 
The results obtained differ with respect to those previously presented in Tables 1 
and 2. As shown in Table 4, the average approval time is now longer in the EU than in 
the US. The reason for this is found in the predominance of priority-review drugs in the 
set of products contemplated in this case -more than 57.0% of those that were able to be 
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classified. Hence the mean approval time for innovations in the EU was 14.3 months 
versus 12.5 months in the US. Only standard drugs obtained shorter mean approval 
times in the EU (14.2 months versus 17.7 months in the US).  
 
It is remarkable that in the EU there is hardly any difference between mean 
approval times for priority and standard drugs. In fact, the average approval time is 
exactly the same for priority NMEs and standard NMEs (14.0 months). The range of 
variation is very similar between products in the EU, which is not the case in the US. 
Furthermore, in the EU the lower and upper limits for all innovations are set by drugs 
classified as standard and priority, respectively, just the contrary to the situation in the 
US. The lower limit (5.5 months) is defined in the EU by a priority-review drug only in 
the case of NMEs. All told, even for NMEs, the upper limit of the range (25.4 months) 
is set by a priority-review drug. For both NMEs as well as for new biologics, the 
dispersion of outlying values is less in the EU than in the US, which plainly reveals that 
a policy that clearly favours priority drugs is not applied.   
 
Finally, the gap between approval times in the EU and in the US is smaller for 
new biologics innovations (15.1 months and 14.7 months, respectively) than for the 
remaining pharmaceutical innovations. This is most likely due to the fact that there were 
already precedents under the concerted procedure (in force until 1994), which in turn, 
reflects the special attention paid to high-technology and biologically-derived medicines 
in the EU since 1987.  Indeed, the centralised procedure “... was designed especially for 
biotech and high-technology products, since Brussels reasoned that it would be easier to 
harmonize standards that had not yet been created than to force States to change their 
existing ones” [11].   
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5. Discussion 
 
Although the goals set in the centralised procedure are being met in the EU, the 
results obtained in the last part of this study reveal that there is hardly any difference in 
approval times based on the products’ degree of therapeutic relevance. This is worthy of 
special attention from a public health standpoint, since it is reasonable to assume that 
earlier or later availability of a standard drug is not of equal importance as in the case of 
a priority drug. In fact, in a study about the relationship between FDA approvals of 
NMEs and changes in the age distribution of deaths, Lichtenberg has demonstrated that 
approval (and the subsequent available stock) of priority-review drugs has a significant 
positive impact on longevity, whereas approval of standard-review drugs does not [12]. 
The new legislation that will govern the centralised procedures starting at the end of 
2005 (Regulation No. 726/2004) foresees accelerated assessment procedures for 
medicinal products of major therapeutic interest and procedures for obtaining temporary 
authorisations subject to certain annually reviewable conditions. If the request of an 
accelerated assessment procedure is accepted, the timelimit of 210 days established for 
scientific assessment and opinion is reduced to 150 days [Article 14 (9)].  The foreseen 
decrease in the review time is applied to the scientific assessment stage and not to the 
decision-making process. It must be indicated that it is precisely the decision-making 
stage that is to be shortened in general in the new procedure foreseen in the regulation. 
This is a clear indication of just how bureaucratic the process is. Moreover, the 
anticipated accelerated assessment procedure is similar to the existing formula for the 
approval of drugs under “exceptional circumstances”, particularly because neither case 
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foresees a prior classification of all new drug and new biologics applications, similar to 
the one in the US. It should be added that the approval of drugs under “exceptional 
circumstances” pathway has hardly ever been used [13].  
 
In the US, the review-time goals established in PDUFA I, II, and III do not 
appear to have been met with regard to standard-review drugs. The fact that they have 
been met for priority-review drugs means that the established priority-review system 
functions satisfactorily. In fact, the US is most commonly the first country in the world 
for which approval of a new drug is requested. Between 1997 and 2001, 70% of the 
applications were presented in the US first and only 19%, in the EU [14]. Nevertheless, 
the strategies followed by pharmaceutical companies for launching their new products 
are guided by other considerations in addition to approval times. They also take into 
account market size and, should it be the case, price regulations and reimbursement 
regimes  -aspects that appear to favour the rapid availability of new drugs in the US 
[15]. For example, since the middle of the 90s, “... the US market had the highest 
percent annual growth rates, coming to account for approximately 40% of the total 
world market for ethical pharmaceuticals in 1999. Europe’s share declined to less than 
27 percent …”, from almost 30 percent in 1995.14 Furthermore, one thing is drug 
approval and another thing is its availability on the market. Thus, Member States have 
sovereignty over pricing and reimbursement regimes, leading to different delay periods 
and subsequently, to unequal access to new drugs across the EU. In this regard, it has 
been estimated that “… there can be as much as 4 years between the first patient in the 
                                                 
14 Data from the IMS International. Taken from [16]. 
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first Member State having access to an innovative medicine, and the first patient in the 
last Member State enjoying the same access” [17].15 
 
Finally, as regards product withdrawals from the market, it seems that the 
percentage of withdrawals is similar in the EU and in the US, despite the differences in 
the approval procedures. In this sense, mention must be made of the possible impact 
recent recalls and withdrawals of several major drugs from the world market might have 
on the future evolution of approval procedures and, hence, on approval times. Thus, the 
withdrawal of Cerivastatin (and the controversy subsequently unleashed),16 along with 
“... a series of controversies involving the safety of hormone replacement therapy, 
antidepressants, antiarthritis drugs ... have raised serious questions about the 
independence of the US drug regulator and led to congressional investigations” [18].  In 
light of the announcement made by the FDA that different measures would be adopted 
to improve the post-marketing surveillance system, the Editorial of The Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA), dated 1 December 2004 was highly critical of 
most of the measures, proposing that “ ... the drug approval process  [be] ... decoupled 
from the postmarketing safety and surveillance system” and that an independent agency 
for drug safety be established [19]. Also, the extension of mandatory postmarketing 
studies to all new products is recommended.17 Remember that, unlike the US, renewal 
of marketing authorisations is compulsory after five years under the EU centralised 
procedure, enabling the EMEA to take new evidence into consideration. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
15 G10 Medicines was created in 2001 under the auspices of the European Commission. Membership 
includes top decision-makers representing national governments, health insurers, industry and patients. It 
had an important influence on the new regulation of drugs in the EU. 
 
16  See, i.e., JAMA, vol. 292, no. 21, December 1, 2004.  
 
17 In this respect, it has been pointed out that “ ... it appears that fewer than half of the postmarketing 
studies that manufacturers have made commitments to undertake as a condition of approval have been 
completed and many have not even been initiated” [19].  
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(EC) Regulation No. 726/2004 establishes that, “The marketing authorisation may be 
renewed after five years on the basis of a re-evaluation by the Agency of the risk-benefit 
balance” but, in principle, “Once renewed, the marketing authorisation shall be valid for 
an unlimited period…” [Article 14 (2 and 3)] compared to the five-year rennovation 
periods currently in force.  
 
In this context, an unprecedented move took place in Europe with the creation of 
The Medicines in Europe Forum, a public interest group of medicines created in 2002 
with the aim of influencing the EU process of drug regulation, from a patient 
perspective. Its membership includes consumer organisations, patient groups, 
organisations that pay for medicines and professional bodies.18 In the European context, 
the demand for principles such as transparency and independence also reveals the need 
to regain confidence in the regulators. Consequently, it can be expected that in the 
coming years, drug safety and the very structure of the Agencies themselves will be 
subject to closer scrutiny than the time they use in the approval process. 
                                                 
18 See http://www.epha.org/a/509. 
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Table 1 
Mean Approval Times (in Months) for Pharmaceutical Innovations (PIs) Authorised in the EU under the Centralised Procedure and in 
the US (1995-2003) 
 
 European Union  (Centralised Procedure) United States  
 PIs (NMEs and  
New Biologics) 
PIs-List A PIs-List B NMEs Standard 
NMEs 
Priority 
NMEs 
New 
Biologics 
PIs (NMEs 
and New 
Biologics) 
 
Year No 
 
Appr.
Time
Clock 
Stop 
Review 
Time 
No  
 
Appr.
Time 
Clock
Stop 
Review
Time
No  Appr. 
 Time 
Clock 
Stop 
Review
Time 
No  
 
Appr. 
Time
No 
 
Appr. 
Time 
No 
 
Appr.
Time 
No Appr.
Time 
No Appr. 
Time 
Year 
1995 
(CM) 
3 10.5
(18.5)
2.0   8.5 2 
 
10.3
(20.4)
1.4 8.9 1 10.9
 (14.7)   
3.1 7.8 28 19.2 19 23.6 9 10.1 2 25.4 30 19.7 1995 
1996 
(CM) 
19 
 
13.0
(15.7)
2.9 10.1 7 
 
15.9
(23.2)
5.2 10.8 12 11.4
 (11.7)   
1.7 9.7 53 17.8 36 19.7 17 13.7 9 24.5 62 18.7 1996 
1997 16 14.7 4.3 10.4 10 
 
15.9 5.5 10.4 6 13.1 2.8 10.3 39 16.2 30 18.2 9 9.4 10 32.4 49 19.5 1997 
1998 17 
 
12.6 3.0 9.6 2 
 
13.0 3.7 9.3 15 12.6 3.0 9.6 30 11.7 14 14.3 16 9.5 9 13.5 39 12.2 1998 
1999 23 
 
14.8 5.4 9.4 11 
 
15.2 6.0 9.2 12 14.5 4.9 9.6 35 12.6 16 16.9 19 9.0 5 17.1 40 13.2 1999 
2000 22 
 
16.0 5.7 10.2 9 
 
13.8 4.5 9.3 13 17.9 6.8 11.0 27 17.6 18 22.7 9 7.4 6 25.8 33 19.1 2000 
2001 30 
 
15.2 5.4 9.8 12 
 
15.1 5.3 9.8 18 15.3 5.5 9.8 24 16.4 17 19.7 7 8.3 8 19.6 32 17.2 2001 
2002 22 
 
15.7 5.7 10.0 7 
 
17.6 7.7 9.9 15 14.8 4.8 10.0 17 17.8 10 20.3 7 14.2 9 30.1 26 22.1 2002 
2003 17 
 
15.3 5.1 10.2 3 
 
17.8 7.2 10.6 14 14.6 4.5 10.1 21 16.9 12 20.5 9 12.0 14 34.7 35 24.0 2003 
Period 
(APE) 
169 
 
14.7 4.8 9.9 63 
 
15.3 5.5 9.8 106 14.4 4.4 10.0 274 16.2 172 19.6 102 10.4 72 26.0 346 18.2 Period 
(APE) 
Period 
(APEE)  
158 14.7 4.8 9.9 56 15.3 5.5 9.8 102 14.4 4.5 9.9   
 
 
 
(Table 1 – continuation) 
 
CM = Corrected Means: all authorisations granted under the centralised procedure in 1995 come from dossiers that began in accordance with the former concertation 
procedure, from which they were transferred to the new centralised procedure. In these cases, the EMEA database records the application validation date as 1 January 1995, 
hence the times are underestimated. This is also the case in 8 of the 19 innovations authorised in 1996. Therefore, for these two years, the actual time used to process the 
dossiers was also calculated. The results of these calculations are shown in parentheses for these two years. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the figures calculated in this 
way are greater than they would have been in normal circumstances. That is, the very transition process from the former system to the new one implies that, in principle, the 
years 1995 and 1996 are not representative. Consequently, the last line reflects the average figure for the entire period, omitting the 11 PIs involved. 
 
APE = Average Period Estimate; the calculation made on average for the entire time period. 
 
APEE =  The calculation made on average for the entire time period, excluding the 11 pharmaceutical innovations initiated under the former concertation procedure. 
 
 
Sources: EU data: Author´s calculations based on the List of Authorised Products (EPARs; European Public Assessment Reports), available at the EMEA website: 
http://www.emea.eu.int/. US data: Total approval times for NMEs and for new biologics obtained from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), available at http://www.phrma.org/; Total approval times for priority NMEs, Standard NMEs and PIs: Author´s calculations on the basis of data from the FDA 
(http://www.fda.gov/ ) and PhRMA.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Median Approval and Review Times (in Months) for Pharmaceutical Innovations (PIs) Authorised in the EU Under  
the Centralised Procedure and in the US (1995-2003) 
 
 European Union (Centralised Procedure) United States 
 PIs (NMEs and  
New Biologics) 
PIs-List A PIs-List B NMEs 
 
Standard NMEs Priority NMEs New 
Biologics
PIs (NMEs
and New 
Biologics) 
 No Appr. 
Time 
Review 
Time 
No Appr. 
Time 
Review
Time 
No Appr. 
Time 
Review
Time 
No Appr.
Time 
Review
Time 
No Appr. 
Time 
Review
Time 
No Appr.
Time 
Review
Time 
No Appr.
 Time
No Appr. 
Time 
1995 
(CM) 
3 10.9
(18.6)
8.6 2 10.3 
(20.4) 
8.9 1 10.9
(14.7)
7.8 28 15.9 15.2 19 17.8 15.9 9 6.0 6.0 2 25.4 30 16.6
1996 
(CM) 
19 12.9
(12.9)
10.3 7 15.9 
(19.1) 
10.7 12 12.1
(12.1)
9.5 53 14.3 12.0 35 15.1 14.6 18 9.6 7.7 9 18.1 62 14.6
1997 16 14.9 10.3  10 15.8 10.3 6 13.0 10.0 39 13.4 12.8 30 15.0 14.4 9 6.7 6.4 10 13.3 49 13.4
1998 17 13.2 10.0 2 13.0 9.3 15 13.2 10.0 30 12.0 11.9 14 13.4 12.3 16 6.2 6.2 9 7.8 39 12.0
1999 23 14.3 9.6 11 15.6 9.6 12 13.4 9.6 35 11.6 10.0 16 16.3 14.0 19 6.9 6.3 5 13.9 40 12.0
2000 22 17.2 10.0 9 14.7 9.7 13 18.5 10.3 27 15.6 13.9 18 19.9 15.4 9 6.0 6.0 6 24.3 33 15.6
2001 30 15.7 9.9 12 15.7 10.0 18 15.6 9.8 24 14.4 - 17 19.0 15.7 7 6.0 6.0 8 21.4 32 16.8
2002 22 15.9 10.2 7 18.1 9.9 15 15.7 10.2 17 16.3 - 10 15.9 12.5 7 16.3 13.8 9 28.8 26 17.3
2003 17 15.3 9.8 3 16.5 10.2 14 14.2 9.8 21 9.9 - 12 23.1 13.8 9 6.7 6.7 14 21.3 35 17.8
 
 
CM = Corrected Medians: all authorisations granted under the centralised procedure in 1995 come from dossiers that began in accordance with the former 
concertation procedure, from which they were transferred to the new centralised procedure. In these cases, the EMEA database records the application validation 
date as 1 January 1995, hence the times are underestimated. This is also the case in 8 of the 19 innovations authorised in 1996. Therefore, for these two years, the 
actual time used to process the dossiers was also calculated. The results of these calculations are shown in parentheses for these two years. Nevertheless, it is very 
likely that the figures calculated in this way are greater than they would have been in normal circumstances. That is, the very transition process from the former 
system to the new one implies that, in principle, the years 1995 and 1996 are not representative. 
 
Sources: EU data: Author´s calculations based on the List of Authorised Products (EPARs; European Public Assessment Reports), available at the EMEA 
website: http://www.emea.eu.int/. US data: Information obtained from various FDA publications available at http://www.fda.gov/, except for the total approval 
times for NMEs authorised in 2001, 2002 and 2003 and approval times for new biologics and PIs as a whole, which have been calculated by the author based on 
the data available at http://www.phrma.org/ 
 
Table 3 
Safety-Based NME Withdrawals in the UE (Centralised Procedure) and in the US 
(Authorised during the period 1995-2003) 
 
Year of 
Authorisation 
 
UE-PIs 
withdrawals 
for explicit   
safety reasons 
Year of 
Withdrawal   
(date of  
reincorporation,
if applicable) 
USA-NMEs 
withdrawals 
for explicit   
safety reasons 
 
Year of 
Withdrawal   
(date of  
reincorporation,
if applicable) 
1995 0 - 0 - 
1996 0 - 0 - 
1997 Levacetylmethadola 
Tolcaponeb 
2001 
1998 (2004) 
Bromfenacc 
Mibefradilc 
Grepafloxinc 
Troglitazonec 
Cerivastatinc 
1998 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
1998 Trovafloxacind 
Alatrofloxacind 
2001 
2001 
0 - 
1999 0 - Rapacuroniumc 2001 
2000 0 - Alosetronc,e 2000 (2002) 
2001 0 - 0 - 
2002 0 - 0 - 
2003 0 - 0 - 
 
 
a Recommendation was made not to market in 2001 and, in fact, it was no longer sold on the 
EU market. This NME had been marketed in Denmark, Germany, Portugal Spain, The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and has been available on the US market since 1994. 
The total approval time by the FDA was 18 days and 912 days by the EMEA [9]. 
b It was pulled from the market in 1998 (on the recommendation of the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products). It was reintroduced in 2004, with special restrictions. It was 
authorised in the US on 29 January 1998. On 17 November of that same year, information 
regarding liver damage was added and hence, required patient consent. 
c None of these active ingredients were authorised in the EU under the centralised procedure, 
although some of them were marketed. For example, Cerivastatin was also removed from the 
European markets in 2001. 
d Marketed in the US, albeit with special safety restrictions. Following the recommendation 
that its authorisation be pulled in 1999, the European Commission decided to withdraw 
authorisation in 2001. These NMEs had been marketed in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and The Netherlands. 
e In 2000, it was taken off the market and its sale was authorised again in 2002, with special 
safety restrictions. 
 
Sources: Elaborated by the author based on the information available at: 
http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/human/withdraw/withdraw.htm and 
http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/human/drugalert/drugalert.htm (for the EU), and 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/ and http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/ (for the US). 
 
Table 4 
Mean Approval Times (in Months) for Pharmaceutical Innovations (PIs) Authorised by Both the EMEA (Centralised Procedure) and 
the FDA during the period 1995-2003 (range in parentheses) 
 
NMEs  New Biologics PIs (NMEs and New Biologics) 
Number US 
Mean time
EU 
Mean Time
      Number US 
Mean time 
EU 
Mean Time
              Number US 
Mean time
EU 
Mean Time 
Totala 84 11.6 
(1.4 – 36.5)
14.0 
(5.5 – 25.4) 
Totalb 33 14.7 
(4.7 – 34.1) 
15.1 
(4.7 – 21.4) 
Totalc 117 12.5 
(1.4 – 36.5)
14.3 
(4.7 – 25.4) 
 - Prioritya 49 8.1 
(1.4 – 28.8)
14.0 
(5.5 – 25.4) 
 - Priority 11 10.7 
(4.7 – 34.1) 
14.9 
(11.5 – 18.7)
 - Priorityc 60 8.6 
(1.4 – 34.1)
14.1 
(5.5 – 25.4) 
- Standarda 35 16.7 
(7.1 – 36.5)
14.0 
(6.8 – 20.3) 
- Standardb 12 21.2 
(9.9 – 30.9) 
14.7 
(4.7 – 19.7) 
- Standardc 47 17.7 
(7.1 – 36.5)
14.2 
(4.7 – 20.3) 
- Not      
classified 
0 - - - Not      
classifiedb 
10 12.3 
(5.4 – 18.1) 
15.9 
(11.1 – 21.4)
- Not      
classifiedc 
10 12.3 
(5.4 – 18.1)
15.9 
(11.1 – 21.4) 
 
 
a 4 NMEs transferred from the former EU concertation procedure that might distort comparisons have been excluded; 2 classified as priority and 2, as standard. 
b 3 NMEs transferred from the former EU concertation procedure that might distort comparisons have been excluded; 2 classified as standard and 1 that was not classified. 
c 7 NMEs transferred from the former EU concertation procedure that might distort comparisons have been excluded; 2 classified as priority; 4, as standard, and 1 that was 
not classified. 
 
Sources: Author´s calculations based on data obtained from the EMEA website (http://www.emea.eu.int/), the FDA website (http://www.fda.gov/) and the PhRMA website 
(http://www.phrma.org/). 
 
 
